We examine whether analysts' prior industry experience influences their ability to serve as effective external firm monitors. Our analyses of firms' financial disclosure, executive compensation and CEO turnover portray a consistent picture that only analysts with related pre-analyst industry experience play an effective monitoring role. These analysts are able to reduce earnings management behavior and the probability of firms committing financial misrepresentation. Their presence also leads to lower CEO excess compensation and higher performance sensitivity of forced CEO turnovers. Our results highlight the importance of analysts' industry expertise and suggest that not all analysts are equal in providing external monitoring.
Introduction
The notion of analyst monitoring goes at least as far back as Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 354-355) , who suggest that security analysts possess comparative advantages in monitoring firm management and thus can play a large role in reducing agency costs.
1 As the quote above illustrates, analysts can be vocal critics of management policies, which can ultimately influence firm behavior. A few months after Baker's call, Jetblue announced that the CEO (Barger) would be resigning at the end of his contract.
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In this paper, we focus on analysts' industry expertise and examine its effect on their monitoring effectiveness. Industry expertise is a critical component of analysts' human capital.
Analysts are assigned to and specialize in few industries to take advantage of economies of scale in information production (Boni and Womack (2006) , Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2012) ).
Surveys of financial analysts and institutional investors consistently indicate that industry expertise is
the most important attribute for analysts (Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharpe (2014) and the annual polls of Institutional Investor magazine). The limited academic attention to analysts' industry experience has so far been confined to their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations (Boni and Womack (2006) , Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2012) , Bradley, Gokkaya, and Liu (2014) ). Whether industry expertise affects analysts' effectiveness in their other functions remains unknown.
We measure analysts' industry expertise based on whether they have prior work experience in related industries of the firms they cover. As elaborated below, despite its positive effect on traditional metrics of analyst performance, the ramifications of industry expertise for the monitoring 1 Monitoring by analysts can take the form of scrutinizing and, if necessary, questioning firms' financial results, performance, and specific policies. Analysts can raise concerns and bring issues to light when they directly interact with firm managers on earnings conference calls (Cohen, Lou, and Malloy (2014) ), express their views in the media and in their research reports (Degeorge et al. (2013) ), or voice their opinions more discreetly through private communication with corporate executives (Brown et al. (2014) and Soltes (2014) ). They can also provide external monitoring as an information intermediary by gathering, analyzing, and disseminating more firm-related information to enhance corporate transparency and help expose managerial misbehavior (Healy and Palepu (2001) ). Recent empirical evidence also suggests that analysts have been directly involved in the unraveling of several financial frauds (Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2010) , Martin, Wang, and Xin (2014) ), whereas Yu (2008) , Irani and Oesch (2013) , and Chen, Harford, and Lin (2013) suggests that analyst coverage improves the quality of corporate decision making. 2 http://fortune.com/2014/09/18/jetblue-ceo-david-barger-to-take-off/. For more examples of analyst monitoring activities, please see http://www.wsj.com/articles/noble-promises-more-transparency-1429664102 (analysts questioning accounting methods and demanding more transparency) and http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/newsarticles/bernstein-research-criticizes-media-ceo-pay/110241 (analyst criticizing CEO pay).
and corporate governance role of analysts are more complex and difficult to determine ex ante. On the one hand, it is possible that analysts with related industry experience in the firms they cover can provide more effective external monitoring because their prior industry experience may allow them to develop a better understanding of the firm's industry. Richer and more in-depth industry knowledge can enhance analysts' ability to analyze firms' financial information and evaluate the strategies and decisions proposed or implemented by firm management. Therefore, analysts with related industry expertise, i.e., industry expert analysts, are better equipped and thus more likely to identify and bring attention to firm policies that do not serve shareholders' best interests. In addition, these analysts also contribute to a more transparent information environment through their more efficient information production and more accurate earnings forecasts (Bradley, Gokkaya, and Liu (2014) ). As a result, industry expert analyst coverage can have the dual effects of reducing managers'
latitude and incentives to engage in self-serving behavior as well as providing an impetus for boards of directors to demand higher accountability of managers for their actions. We term this view the effective monitor hypothesis.
On the other hand, prior work experience in a firm's related industry may reduce analysts'
incentive to monitor firm management in subtle, but potentially important ways. For example, having worked in the firm's related industry increases the likelihood that the analysts and the firm's managers know each other if their career paths have crossed or they have met at work functions such as industry trade shows or conventions. Likewise, related industry work experience also increases the chance of social connections being developed between the analysts and firm management through common friends or acquaintances from within the industry. These social ties can potentially cloud analysts' views, causing them to be more likely to agree with rather than disapprove of the decisions made by managers. Together, these different channels imply that related industry experience can impair the incentives of analysts to monitor firm management, allowing corporate insiders to indulge more in activities that benefit themselves at shareholders' expense. We term this view the impaired monitor hypothesis.
We test these hypotheses by examining the effects of industry expert analyst coverage on several major corporate policies including financial disclosure, CEO compensation, and CEO turnover. A large part of an analyst's job entails the perusal and analysis of financial information disclosed by firms to the capital markets and the use of such disclosure as a basis to evaluate managerial decision making and forecast future performance. Therefore, we start our analysis by relating analyst industry expertise to a number of observable outcomes of the choices made by managers in firms' financial disclosure. This is also in keeping with earlier studies by Yu (2008) and Irani and Oesch (2013) that examine the effect of analyst monitoring on corporate financial reporting quality.
We first examine the impact of analyst industry expertise on earnings management through discretionary accruals. Earnings management is considered as a manifestation of the agency problems between managers and shareholders, because managers are able to extract various forms of private benefits and personal gains by manipulating reported financial results (e.g., Perry and Williams (1994) and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) ). Shareholders, on the other hand, bear significant costs when aggressive earnings management leads to financial misreporting that results in earnings restatements, shareholder lawsuits, and regulatory/legal sanctions against the firm (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) and Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008) ). Analysts have incentives to be vigilant about aggressive earnings management as Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2010) find that failure to detect accounting fraud at covered firms increases an analyst's probability of being demoted.
As Dichev, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2013) point out, it is difficult for outsiders to detect earnings manipulation, but large deviations from industry and peer norms can serve as a red flag for potential financial misreporting because a substantial portion of a firm's financial reporting choices is driven by operations and economic conditions specific to its industry. Therefore, relevant industry expertise and knowledge are essential for the evaluation of many aspects of corporate financial reporting. Consistent with this notion, we find that coverage by more analysts with expertise in a firm's related industry significantly reduces the firm's earnings management. In contrast, coverage by other analysts is not related to earnings management behavior. These results are robust to controlling for a wide range of analyst and firm-specific attributes. Our evidence lends support to the effective monitor hypothesis and suggests that related industry expertise obtained by analysts from their pre-analyst employment is crucial for them to assess and monitor firms' financial disclosure.
Next we extend prior research on analyst monitoring by investigating the effect of analyst industry expertise on the probability of firms intentionally committing material financial misreporting. If analysts with industry expertise play a more effective monitoring role and increase the probability of detection of financial manipulation, then managers may be less likely to engage in these egregious activities. We use the F-score developed by Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan (2011) to capture the ex-ante probability of firms engaging in financial misreporting and earnings restatements as an ex-post measure of financial misreporting. We find that both measures are significantly lower when firms are followed by more analysts with related industry expertise. As is the case with our earnings management results, coverage by other analysts is not related to the probability of financial misreporting.
In further analysis, we examine firms' CEO compensation and CEO turnover decisions. We find that coverage by industry expert analysts significantly reduces the level of CEO excess compensation and increases the responsiveness of firms in replacing poorly performing CEOs.
Closely echoing the results from our financial disclosure analysis, we find that coverage by other analysts is not related to either CEO compensation or CEO turnover decisions. These results provide additional support for the effective monitor hypothesis.
A potentially serious econometric concern with respect to our analyses is identification.
Since analyst coverage in general, and coverage by industry expert analysts in particular, are not random and most likely endogenously determined, it is difficult to make any causal statement about the relations between industry expert analyst coverage and various aspects of corporate decision making that emerge from our baseline OLS regressions. For example, rather than industry expert analysts causally reducing agency problems, it could be that industry expert analysts utilize their superior industry knowledge to identify and provide coverage for firms with fewer agency problems.
To overcome the identification challenge, we conduct additional analysis whenever possible in which we focus on exogenous disappearances of analysts caused by brokerage house mergers or closures following Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) . We observe a significant increase in firms' earnings management, ex-ante probability of committing material financial misstatement (F-score), and CEO excess compensation after they lose analyst coverage due to a brokerage merger or closure. However, consistent with the baseline OLS results, this pattern only holds for the loss of coverage by analysts with related industry expertise. 3 This evidence points to a causal effect of industry expert analyst coverage on corporate policies.
Overall, our findings clearly indicate that industry expert analysts provide external monitoring of firm managers and improve corporate governance. One interesting question related to the literature on analyst monitoring in general and our paper in particular is whether there are any costs to analysts in monitoring corporate managers that reduce their incentive to monitor in the first place. To shed some light on this issue, we postulate that analysts are less likely to be effective monitors of firms with which their employers have investment banking relationships, because doing so may potentially strain the relationship between firm managers and analysts' employers and lead to a reduction or loss of investment banking businesses. Results from our analysis are consistent with this conjecture. Specifically, we find that the hitherto reported effects of industry expert analysts on firms' financial disclosure, CEO compensation, and CEO turnover polies are largely driven by "unaffiliated" industry expert analysts, whose employers have no investment banking relationship with the firms.
Our study makes two primary contributions to the literature. First, our investigation into multiple major corporate policies conveys a consistent message that industry expertise is a critical element in enabling financial analysts to perform their external monitoring function in followed firms. We complement recent studies on analysts' monitoring role by identifying which analysts are more effective monitors. In this respect, our evidence also complements the finding by Yu (2008) that analysts working for top brokers and with more forecasting experience have a larger effect on firms' earnings management. These results together highlight the importance of exploring analyst heterogeneities. It is worth noting that the effect of analyst industry expertise we document is incremental to those of an analyst's general, industry-specific, and firm-specific forecasting experience and thus represents a new and distinct attribute that impacts analysts' ability to fulfill their monitoring roles.
Second, we add to the emerging literature that investigates the implications of industry expertise for a variety of economic agents in corporate and financial market settings, such as CEOs, corporate directors, and investment banks (e.g., Liu and Ritter (2011), Custodio and Mertzer (2013) , Wang, Xie and Zhang (2014) ). Our paper is the first to demonstrate the importance of industry expertise for the monitoring and corporate governance role of financial analysts. As such, our findings complement the evidence in Bradley, Gokkaya, and Liu (2014) that industry expertise enables analysts to make more accurate earnings forecasts as well as the evidence in Dass et al. (2013) , Masulis et al. (2014) and Wang, Xie, and Zhu (2013) that industry expertise facilitates the corporate governance functions of corporate boards.
The rest of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents descriptive statistics. Section 3 reports our empirical findings from investigations of firms' financial disclosure, CEO compensation, and CEO turnover decisions, as well as additional robustness tests.
Section 4 concludes.
Data and descriptive statistics
The primary data employed in this study are constructed from a number of sources. We first merge Institutional Broker Estimate System (I/B/E/S) with CRSP/Compustat to obtain firm financial statement and stock price and return information. We next identify sell-side analysts who provided at least one annual earnings forecast and merge this sample with the I/B/E/S recommendation file to retrieve analyst last names, first name initials and brokerage house information. We eliminate analysts with missing information on first name initials and last names and also discard analyst research teams since only the last names of analyst team members can be obtained from I/B/E/S. This initial screening results in 9,305 unique analysts following 6,793 firms from 1983 to 2011.
We next conduct a thorough search on Zoominfo.com, an employment background indexing website, to capture the surviving analysts' full first names. We follow a very conservative approach in our web search and require that analyst last names, first name initials, and brokerage houses match the information gathered from I/B/E/S. This leaves us with 6,461 analysts. For each remaining analyst in our sample, we manually collect information on employment backgrounds from
LinkedIn.com, the world's largest professional network. 4 We search for the analyst's full name along with the corresponding brokerage house's name and collect detailed information on the names of the analyst's pre-analyst employers and years of employment. The analysts in our sample have 6,211 prior employers, 450 of which are publicly-traded. We next break down the analysts' employment experience into "related" and "unrelated" at the firm-level within their coverage portfolio. An analyst is coded as having "related industry experience" in a covered firm if the firm and the analyst's prior employer(s) share the same Fama-French (FF) 5-industry classification. Pre-analyst work experience is defined as "unrelated experience" if the FF 5-industry classifications of the followed firm and the analyst's prior employer(s) do not match. 5, 6 Analysts without pre-analyst industry work experience are classified as "inexperienced."
4 Since having a LinkedIn profile is voluntary, we examine whether there are any observable differences in ability or quality between analysts with and without a LinkedIn profile. We compare the life-time earnings forecast accuracy between the two groups of analysts and find no significant difference. 5 To classify private firms' industries in analyst employment data, we conduct thorough web searches and assign each firm manually to one of the 5 Fama French industry classifications based on the business descriptions obtained from the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) website, business news websites (e.g., Bloomberg and BusinessWeek) or company official websites. 6 A reasonable concern with our analysis is that related experience is defined by the broad Fama-French 5-industry classification. This is due to the fact that private firms significantly outnumber publicly-traded firms and it is difficult to ***Insert Table 1 here*** Panel C shows that the median firm is covered by 3 sell-side analysts, with one having related pre-analyst industry experience (Related analysts), one having unrelated pre-analyst industry experience (Unrelated analysts), and one having no pre-analyst industry experience (Inexperienced assign private firms into finer industries. It should be noted that any misclassification would introduce noise and bias against finding any significant differences between related and unrelated industry experience. Nevertheless, we use a subsample of analysts who were employed at public firms and repeat our analyses with industries defined by the finer Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). Our results remain intact (see Section 3.5.2). 7 We follow Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) and define institutional investors as dedicated or transient using Bushee's (1998) classification methodology.
analysts). We separately calculate an analyst's general and firm-specific forecasting experience as the number of years since the analyst initially appeared in I/B/E/S (Experience as analyst) and the number of years in which the analyst provided coverage for a particular firm (Experience with firm). For the median firm in our sample, the median analyst covering the firm has 6 years of general experience, 2 years of firm-specific experience, a research portfolio consisting of 12 unique firms (Portfolio size), and 60% of analysts work at a top brokerage house (Analysts from top brokers).
Empirical results
In this section, we present the results from our examination of the effective monitor hypothesis versus the impaired monitor hypothesis. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 evaluate the quality of a firm's financial disclosure policy in relation to coverage by financial analysts with related industry experience, with Section 3.1 on accruals-based earnings management and Section 3.2 on measures of financial misreporting. Section 3.3 investigates the effect of financial analyst industry experience on CEO compensation policies. Section 3.4 examines whether the presence of financial analysts with related industry experience affects the sensitivity of forced CEO turnovers to firm performance. Section 3.5 reports a number of robustness checks and additional analyses.
The effect of analyst industry expertise on earnings management
We examine whether the presence of industry expert analysts (Related analysts) is related to firms' earnings management, which we measure using the absolute value of discretionary accruals (Abs_DA). Discretionary accruals are estimated based on a modified Jones (1991) model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) , Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) ). 8 Managers have incentives to manage earnings upward (e.g., to inflate the stock price prior to their stock sales, or to hit performance targets for bonuses) as well as downward (e.g., prior to option repricing or management buyouts or as an attempt to smooth earnings). Because our hypotheses are related to the magnitude rather than the direction of earnings management, we follow prior studies, such as Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Yu (2008) , and use the absolute value of discretionary accruals scaled by total assets as our dependent variable of interest.
8 We obtain qualitatively similar results with higher statistical significance when we adjust the discretionary accruals for firm performance as suggested by Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) . Specifically, we follow Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008) to first sort all firms into quintile portfolios based on their lagged ROAs for each 2-digit SIC industry in each fiscal year. For each firm, the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals is equal to the difference between the firm's discretionary accruals estimated from the modified Jones model and the average discretionary accruals from the modified Jones model for the firm's industry and performance matched portfolio.
The effective monitor hypothesis argues that by virtue of their more in-depth knowledge and understanding of a firm's industry, industry expert analysts are better able to identify abnormalities in the firm's financial reporting that represent large deviations from industry norms. Therefore, they are more likely to discover deliberate attempts by managers to distort the firm's financial condition and obfuscate the firm's true performance. Anticipating the scrutiny from industry expert analysts and faced with the prospect of being questioned and challenged by these analysts on their financial disclosure choices, managers are likely to refrain from engaging in excessive earnings management.
Therefore, we expect coverage by industry expert analysts to reduce the extent of a firm's earnings management behavior. The impaired monitor hypothesis, however, contends that financial analysts with related industry expertise have weakened incentives to critically evaluate a firm's financial disclosure and if necessary, to voice their concerns about the choices made by firms in the financial reporting process. The more tacit stance taken by these analysts can weaken the overall monitoring of firms and allow managers to engage in more earnings management.
Baseline OLS regressions
To empirically test these predictions, we first estimate OLS regressions of earnings management against analyst coverage while explicitly controlling for a battery of firm and analystlevel characteristics as discussed in Section 2. We include firm and year-fixed effects in the regressions to mitigate potential concerns about time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics being correlated with both earnings management and analyst coverage (Fich and Shivdasani (2006) ).
Our formal model is specified in equation (1) Table 2 here*** Table 2 reports the regressions results. As in the rest of the tables, in parentheses below coefficient estimates are robust t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. As a starting point of our analysis, we replicate the finding by Yu (2008) and Irani and Oesch (2013) that analyst coverage reduces firms' earnings management. Specifically, in model 1, we regress a firm's absolute value of discretionary accruals (Abs_DA) against the total number of analysts following the firm. Consistent with analysts playing an external monitoring role, we find that total analyst coverage is significantly and negatively associated with Abs_DA.
Next we decompose the total number of analysts following a firm into the numbers of analysts with related industry expertise (Related analysts), analysts with unrelated industry expertise (Unrelated analysts), and analysts without any pre-analyst industry work experience (Inexperienced analysts). We reestimate the abnormal accruals regression and present the results under model 2. We find that only coverage by financial analysts with related industry experience is significantly and negatively related to a firm's abnormal accruals. While the coefficients on the other two types of analyst coverage are also negative, they are not statistically significant. These findings suggest that the negative association between analyst coverage and earnings management documented by prior studies (Yu (2008) , Irani and Oesch (2013) , and Chen, Harford, and Lin (2013)) is largely driven by analysts with related industry experience. As such, they support the effective monitor hypothesis that financial analysts with related industry experience provide more effective monitoring of firms' financial disclosure.
Since industry expertise obtained from pre-analyst employment is only one attribute of analysts, it is important for us to ensure that industry experience is not capturing other analyst characteristics that could also affect analysts' ability to limit firms' earnings management. For instance, Yu (2008) provides empirical evidence that analysts with longer forecasting experience might be more effective in curbing earnings management behavior. Therefore, we include a wide array of analyst-specific controls in Model 3. Nonetheless, the inclusion of other analyst characteristics such as forecasting experience (either general or firm-specific), employment at top brokerage houses, and portfolio size, has little effect on the relation between industry expert analyst coverage and earnings management. An empirical challenge in identifying a causal relation between analyst coverage and corporate financial disclosure is the possibility that an analyst's decision to cover a firm is associated with observable factors that could also affect the firm's financial reporting (Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) ). Therefore, we follow Yu (2008) and construct residual analyst coverage to mitigate this potential endogeneity concern. Residual coverage is defined as the component of analyst coverage uncorrelated with firm-specific control variables and the main determinants of earnings management as listed in Panel B of Table 1 . 10 We then use residual coverage as our main proxy for analyst coverage in the remaining analysis. 11 Results from regressions of abnormal accruals against residual analyst coverage measures in models 4 through 6 are very similar to those from models 1 through 3.
Brokerage mergers and closures as quasi-natural experiments
As an alternative and more rigorous approach to alleviating endogeneity concerns, we exploit a unique setting where there is an unexpected exogenous shock to a firm's analyst coverage independent of the firm's characteristics or earnings management behavior. Specifically, our identification strategy relies on two plausibly exogenous quasi-natural experiments, namely, brokerage closures (Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012)) and brokerage mergers (Hong and Kacpercyzk (2010)). These brokerage-related events are used by a growing body of research to study the impact of financial analyst coverage on a wide array of firm policies.
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Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) argue that following a merger, termination of coverage by the surviving broker could be endogenous because it chose to no longer cover the stock. Thus, we follow their lead and only focus on losses of coverage resulting from a merger where a stock was covered by analysts from both brokers before the merger and by only one of the analysts after the merger. We identify 17 brokerage house closures and 37 brokerage house mergers over the period of 1988 to 2008 and construct a sample of 600 unique treatment firms that were covered by the closed or merged brokers prior to these events. 13 Following prior studies such as Irani and Oesch (2013) and Chen, Harford, and Lin (2013) , we employ a two-year event window around brokerage closures or mergers and examine the change in the financial reporting quality of treatment firms from the pre- 10 We estimate a series of analyst coverage regressions, where the dependent variables are the number of 1) all analysts 2) analysts with related industry experience, 3) analysts with unrelated industry experience, and 4) analysts without any prior industry experience. The residuals from these regressions are then labeled as "residual coverage" for the corresponding type of analysts. Untabulated results indicate that the determinants of analyst coverage are quantitatively and qualitatively similar across these three types of analysts. For instance, analyst coverage is positively related to firm size and growth rate of assets, but negatively related to external financing activities. 11 Results from all other remaining analyses are qualitatively similar if we use raw analyst coverage in lieu of residual coverage. 12 See, e.g., Fong et al. (2012) , Derrien, Kecskes and Mansi (2012) , Irani and Oesch (2013), Balakrishnan et al. (2013) , Chen, Harford, and Lin (2013) , Degeorge et al. (2013) , and He and Tian (2013) . 13 Brokerage closure data is from Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) and He and Tian (2013) coefficient=1.153, t-stat=2.678 ). Specifically, all else being equal, the average absolute value of discretionary accruals of firms losing industry expert analysts is 1.15% higher in the post-event year compared to the pre-event year. This is a sizable increase given the mean and median values of Abs_DA in our sample being 6.0% and 3.8%. Overall, these results provide causal support for the effective monitor hypothesis and suggest that related industry expertise is critical for financial analysts to perform their monitoring function.
Industry expert analyst coverage and financial misreporting by firms
So far we have shown that coverage by industry expert analysts limits earnings management by followed firms. In this section, we examine a more egregious type of behavior by managers and consider whether these analysts also reduce the likelihood of firms committing financial misreporting. We follow Wang, Xie, and Zhu (2013) and employ both ex-ante and ex-post measures of financial misreporting. We use the F-score developed by Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan (2011) to measure the ex-ante probability of a firm committing financial misrepresentation. Our ex-post indicator of financial misreporting is earnings restatements by firms.
Analyst industry expertise and F-score
Dechow et al. (2011) construct a comprehensive database through careful examination of firms subject to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement actions as indicated in Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). They then identify a sample of firms that have misstated at least one of their quarterly or annual financial statements with the intent of misleading investors. They create the F-score from a model that analyzes the financial characteristics of these misstating firms.
We employ a multivariate OLS regression to examine the importance of industry expert analysts in lowering the ex-ante probability of financial fraud as proxied by the F-score. Other than the dependent variable, the model specification is exactly the same as equation (1). Panel A of Table   4 presents the regression results. ***Insert Table 4 here*** Perhaps the most immediate takeaway from Model 1 of Panel A is that the intensity of analyst following is significantly and negatively related to a firm's F-score, suggesting that analyst coverage reduces firms' ex-ante likelihood of earnings manipulation via external monitoring.
However, once we distinguish between analysts based on their industry expertise, we find that this result is driven by coverage by analysts with related industry experience (Model 2). For example, a one-standard deviation increase in the coverage by industry expert analysts reduces the F-score by 0.095, representing an 8.0% reduction in the ex-ante likelihood of financial fraud given that the average F-score in our sample is about 1.181. Conversely, coverage by analysts with unrelated industry experience or no industry experience does not result in a lower ex-ante probability of intentional financial misrepresentation.
We next reexamine the relation between industry expert analyst coverage and the F-score using exogenous shocks to a firm's analyst coverage due to brokerage closures or mergers. As in the earnings management analysis in Section 3.1.2, we employ a two-year event window around brokerage closures or mergers and examine the change in a firm's F-score from year t-1 to year t+1, with year t representing the year in which the firm loses analyst coverage due to a brokerage closure or merger. The key independent variables include four indicator variables capturing whether a firm loses 1) any analysts; 2) analysts with related industry experience; 3) analysts with unrelated industry experience; and 4) analysts without any industry experience. The control variables are changes in firm characteristics and other analyst characteristics from year t-1 to year t+1, thus eliminating the need for firm fixed effects. Panel B of Table 4 presents the regression results.
In model 1, we find that firms experience a significant increase in the F-score when they experience a loss of analyst coverage, consistent with monitoring by analysts reducing firms' ex ante probability of committing serious financial misreporting. In model 2, when we differentiate between the types of analyst coverage lost by firms, we find that only the loss of coverage by industry expert analysts leads to a significant increase in a firm's F-score. This result reaffirms our finding from Panel A about the importance of related industry experience in facilitating the monitoring role of analysts, thereby lending further support to the effective monitor hypothesis.
Analyst industry expertise and earnings restatements
Our sample of earnings restatements is obtained from the U.S. General Accounting Office's that compared to error restatements, irregularity restatements are met with significantly more negative announcement returns (on average: -14% vs. -2%), are followed by shareholder class action lawsuits at a significantly higher rate, and lead to significantly more CEO/CFO turnovers. Therefore, we focus on irregularity restatements because they represent clear instances of deliberate and material earnings manipulation by managers. For each irregularity restatement, we obtain information on the specific years for which financial results were restated due to earnings manipulation.
We merge the restated year information with our comprehensive CRSP-Compustat-I/B/E/S sample and obtain a sample of 14,072 firm-year observations from 1997 to 2006. In about 2% (281) firm-years, earnings were restated due to accounting irregularities. 14 We estimate probit regressions to examine whether coverage by industry expert analysts affects the probability of a firm committing intentional financial misreporting in a given year. The dependent variable is equal to one for restated firm-years and zero otherwise. 
Analyst industry expertise and CEO compensation
Our investigation up to this point has focused on the influence of analyst industry expertise on corporate financial disclosure. In ensuing analyses, we explore implications of analyst industry expertise for some other major corporate policies such as CEO compensation (this section) and CEO turnover (next section) decisions.
In the context of firms' executive compensation policy, Chen, Harford, and Lin (2013) show that analyst coverage can serve an additional layer of market discipline to reduce excess 14 There are 428 firm-years in which earnings were restated due to accounting errors. Our results are nearly identical if we exclude these observations from our analysis. 15 As we point out in footnote 3, we are not able to use brokerage closures/mergers as a quasi-natural experiment to reexamine the relation between industry expert analyst coverage and the probability of intentional financial misreporting that leads to earnings restatements because only two firms announced irregularity restatements after losing research coverage by industry expert analysts. 16 In untabulated results, we use a firm being the target of a securities class-action lawsuit as an alternative ex-post measure of financial misreporting, to the extent that earnings manipulation with an intention to mislead investors can lead to class-action lawsuits (DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik (2004)). We obtain a comprehensive sample of 3,566 securities class action lawsuits on 2,152 unique firms from 1996 to 2011 from the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse website (http://securities.stanford.edu/). We find that coverage by industry expert analysts significantly reduces the probability of a firm being targeted by a class-action lawsuit, whereas coverage by other analysts is not significantly related to the probability of being sued.
compensation received by top executives. We argue that analysts' industry expertise can provide them with a comparative advantage in understanding industry and firm-specific factors that have economic impacts on the competitive level of executive compensation. As a result, they are more likely to recognize large discrepancies between a CEO's actual pay and her fair and competitive level of pay, and when they do, they can voice their concern to cast unfavorable light on firms. Their opinions are also likely to be taken seriously by managers and boards because of analysts' unique position to influence the stock price. 17 As such, the effective monitor hypothesis predicts that firms followed by more industry expert analysts are less likely to award exorbitant compensation packages to their top executives. The impaired monitor hypothesis, however, argues that analysts with related industry experience may be connected to the managers of the firms they follow and thus have less incentive to question overly generous CEO pay.
To test these predictions, we obtain CEO compensation information including salary, bonus, stock and option grants, and long-term incentive plans from Standard & Poor's ExecuComp database for our sample. This yields information on CEOs of 2,161 unique firms covered by an average (median) number of 1.66 (1) analysts with related industry expertise. We assess the impact of analyst industry expertise on excess CEO compensation. To estimate excess CEO compensation, we regress the logarithmic transformation of total CEO compensation against a firm's market capitalization, buy-and-hold abnormal returns over CRSP value-weighted returns, stock return volatility, as well as industry (based on two-digit SIC codes) and year fixed effects. The residuals from this estimation is our measure of excess CEO compensation (e.g., Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) , Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2009) (Chen, Harford, and Lin (2013) ) (model 1), but the relation is again driven by analysts with related industry expertise in their followed firms (model 2). In terms of economic significance, the coefficient on the coverage by analysts with related industry experience in Column 2 implies that for a one-standard deviation increase in the number of industry expert analysts, excess CEO compensation is lower by 2.90%, representing roughly a reduction of $101,636 in CEO compensation given that the average CEO pay is $3.51 million in our sample. Consistent with earlier results, coverage by analysts without related industry experience does not have a significant impact on excess CEO pay.
In further analysis, we exploit the exogenous shocks to a firm's analyst coverage created by brokerage house closures and mergers to speak directly to the causal nature of the relation between industry expert analyst coverage and CEO compensation. Specifically, we focus on the change in a firm's CEO total or excess compensation from year t-1 to year t+1, with year t being the year in which the firm loses analyst coverage due to a brokerage closure or merger. We examine how the compensation change is related to a firm's loss of analyst coverage while controlling for changes in firm and other analyst characteristics. Panel B of Table 6 presents the regression results. The dependent variable is the change in excess CEO compensation. We find that the excess compensation for a firm's CEO experiences a significant increase following the loss of analyst coverage (model 1). When we break down the loss of analyst coverage based on the types of analysts, we find that only the loss of coverage by industry expert analysts leads to a significant increase in CEO compensation (model 2). These results suggest that coverage by industry expert analysts indeed has a causal effect on a firm's CEO compensation policy and are consistent with the effective monitor hypothesis that the external monitoring by industry expert analysts reduces the level of CEO total and excess compensation.
Industry expert analyst coverage and CEO turnover-performance sensitivity
In this section we investigate whether coverage by industry expert analysts affects the responsiveness of boards in removing poorly performing CEOs. Analysts with expertise in a firm's related industries are likely to have a more thorough understanding of the firm's operating environment, and the opportunities and challenges it faces. Therefore, they are likely to be able to better analyze and evaluate major corporate strategies and decision making. When firm performance disappoints, they can put more pressure on the firm to change its strategic direction and, if necessary, change its leadership. As a result, under the effective monitor hypothesis, we expect a firm's board to replace its CEO in a more timely manner in response to poor performance when it is covered by more analysts with related industry expertise. However, under the impaired monitor hypothesis, we expect analysts with related industry experience to take a more passive stance in the face of subpar firm performance, thus contributing to a slower response by boards to replace poorly performing managers.
To examine these conjectures, we follow Jenter and Kanaan (2013) and construct our primary dataset of CEO forced turnovers from Standard & Poor's ExecuComp database. We then use news reports collected from Lexis-Nexis to ascertain that CEO turnover is forced, not due to any of the following reasons such as death, health problems, retirement, or promotion to a higher/comparable position at another firm (e.g., Parrino (1997) , Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004) , among others).
We estimate a probit model to assess the marginal impact of industry expert analysts on the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. The dependent variable equals one for years in which a forced CEO turnover event occurs, and zero otherwise. The key independent variables include abnormal firm performance, measured by the firm's industry-adjusted abnormal stock return over the previous year, and its interaction terms with the three types of analyst coverage. 18 This model specification allows the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity to vary with the coverage of different types of analysts. ***Insert Table 7 here*** Table 7 reports the probit regression results. We find a significantly negative coefficient on the abnormal stock return, affirming the well documented negative relation between the probability of forced CEO turnover and firm performance (see, e.g., Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) , Weisbach, (1988) , Fich and Shivdasani (2006) ). More importantly, the interaction term between abnormal stock return and coverage by industry expert analysts has significantly negative coefficient, while the coefficients on the other two interaction terms are insignificant. This evidence is consistent with the notion that the external monitoring by industry expert analysts makes corporate boards more responsive to poor firm performance in disciplining poorly performing CEOs. Conversely, coverage by analysts without related industry expertise is not related to the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Similarly, Guan, Wong, and Zhang (2013) show that analysts simultaneously following a covered firm's customers issue more accurate earnings forecasts for the suppliers than analysts who do not.
Therefore, to mitigate the potential concern that pre-analysts industry expertise may simply proxy for analyst experience from covering firms in related industries, we include indicators for analysts following firms in related industries as well as analysts following the customers or suppliers of covered firms. The results presented in models 2 and 3 suggest that the effect of pre-analyst industry experience on earnings management remains significantly negative. Interestingly, we find that experience in covering a firm's customers or suppliers can also help analysts reduce the firm's earnings management behavior (see model 3).
We also control for analysts' accounting experience, which may enhance their capability to identify earnings manipulations and thus deter firms from engaging in such practice. We capture an analyst's accounting experience by whether the analyst has a CPA or worked for a Big-N accounting firm. We then compute the number of analysts with accounting experience covering each firm.
Model 4 presents the results of this analysis. The coefficient on the number of analysts with accounting experience is negative, but not significantly different from zero. Including this variable does not materially impact the coefficient of our main variable of interest.
Finally, Wang, Xie, and Zhu (2013) find that audit committees with more independent directors with industry expertise, which they term as industry expert directors (IEDs), reduce firms' earnings management behavior and probability to engage in fraud. To ensure that industry expert 
Industry expertise defined using finer industry classifications
A reasonable concern with our analysis is that related industry experience is defined based on the broad Fama-French 5-industry classifications due to the majority (72.5%) of pre-analyst employer firms being private. However, any misclassification should bias against finding any significant results for our main research questions as a result of introducing noise. Nevertheless, we repeat our main analyses using a subset of analysts that worked only for publicly-traded employers in pre-analyst years, because we can classify these employers into finer industries. For this subsample of 1,158 analysts, we redefine related and unrelated experience using Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) as suggested by Boni and Womack (2006) and Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2012) . 21 Table 9 presents the results from re-estimating regressions of abnormal accruals, the exante and ex-post probabilities of material financial misreporting, CEO total and excess 20 All of our other results are robust to the inclusion of these additional controls as well. We do not report them in the paper for brevity, but they are available upon request. 21 More specifically, we use the 24 industry groups under the GICS classification system. Bradley, Gokkaya, and Liu (2014) also provide a similar analysis for the subset of analysts with experience at publicly-traded firms. Their results are robust to using this smaller sample.
compensation, and the probability of forced CEO turnovers. We find that coverage by industry expert analysts continues to significantly reduce earnings management and the likelihood of material financial misrepresentation, rein in CEO total and excess compensation, and increase the sensitivity of forced CEO turnovers to firm performance. ***Insert Table 9 here***
Discussion on analysts' monitoring costs
Our paper provides pervasive evidence in support of the effective monitoring hypothesis that industry expertise aids in analysts' monitoring of firm management. We help advance the extant literature on analyst monitoring by highlighting the importance of industry expertise. One question related to this literature in general is whether analysts bear any costs in monitoring firm management and if so, whether such costs can be severe enough to reduce analysts' incentive to monitor in the first place. It is entirely conceivable that certain situations could arise that weaken analysts' monitoring incentive. For instance, a voluminous literature suggests that analysts affiliated with banks that have an underwriting relationship with a firm provide overly optimistic recommendations for the firm's stock (e.g., Lin and McNichols (1998), Michaely and Womack (1999) ). Such a relationship could compromise analysts' willingness to be effective monitors if their monitoring may potentially alienate or even antagonize firm managers and jeopardize existing investment banking relationships. This view is confirmed by Brown et al. (2014) , who survey sell-side analysts about the incentives they face. Citing one of the respondent's answers, "Equity analysts… are very, very reluctant-even after the Spitzer rules-to upset the investment bankers, because the investment bankers bring in so much more profitability…They certainly realize that the success of their company is tied to the performance of this much higher-margin business than the business that they're part of."
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to fully investigate the costs or adverse consequences to analysts related to their monitoring role, we try to shed some light on this issue by examining if investment banking pressures reduce the monitoring incentives of industry expert analysts. We classify industry expert analysts as affiliated with firm management if their employers provided equity underwriting or M&A advisory services for the firm within the past 3 years, and unaffiliated otherwise. About 15% of the industry expert analysts are classified as affiliated. We treat affiliated and unaffiliated industry expert analyst coverage as separate variables and include them simultaneously in the reexamination of financial reporting, CEO compensation, and CEO turnover policies. We estimate both baseline regressions and regressions based on exogenous shocks to analyst coverage. Unfortunately, depending on the corporate policy under examination, we only observe between 2 and 13 cases of exogenous losses of affiliated industry expert analysts from brokerage closures. This potentially reduces the power of our tests and limits our ability to provide meaningful evidence using exogenous shocks. With this caveat in mind, the results from our analyses indicate that the disciplining effects of industry expert analyst coverage on the corporate policies of interest are driven by unaffiliated industry expert analysts (see Table 10 ) . These findings are consistent with our conjecture that analysts whose employers have existing investment banking relationships with the covered firm face higher costs and pressure in monitoring firm managers and thus have weaker incentives to do so.
Conclusion
Jensen and Meckling (1976) first broached the idea of analysts being capable of playing a monitoring role to reduce agency problems. Consistent with their supposition, recent research (e.g., Yu (2008) , Irani and Oesch (2013), Chen, Harford, and Lin (2013)) has produced a growing body of evidence suggesting that analyst coverage can improve corporate governance, managerial incentives, and firm decision making. In this paper we examine whether analysts' industry experience obtained from pre-analyst employment affects their effectiveness as external monitors of followed firms. Our analyses of firms' financial disclosure, executive compensation, and CEO turnover decisions indicate that only financial analysts with related industry experience in their followed firms can play an effective monitoring role. More specifically, we find that coverage by industry expert financial analysts is able to rein in firms' earnings management behavior and reduce both the ex-ante probability and ex-post occurrence of firms committing financial misrepresentation. The presence of these analysts also reduces CEO excess compensation and increases the sensitivity of forced CEO turnovers to firm performance. In stark contrast, coverage by other analysts is not significantly related to these corporate policies. Our results highlight the importance of analysts' pre-analyst industry work experience and resultant industry expertise, and suggest that not all analysts are equal in providing external monitoring of firms.
In light of the evidence in this paper, a potentially fruitful direction for future research is to further explore heterogeneities among analysts and the implications for their monitoring efficacy.
Additional work in this area can help deliver a more complete understanding of the roles and impact of financial analysts in the capital markets and corporate decision making. (White (1980) ) and firm clustering (Petersen (2009) This table presents earnings management OLS regression results for the loss of analyst coverage due to exogenous shocks stemming from brokerage mergers/closures. The dependent variable is the change in absolute value of discretionary accruals (Abs_DA) from before to after the exogenous brokerage event. Four key independent variables are created to capture whether a firm loses 1) any analysts; 2) analysts with related industry experience; 3) analysts with unrelated industry experience, and 4) analysts without any industry experience. The control variables are also changes in firm characteristics and other analyst characteristics from year t-1 to year t+1. See Appendix 1 for a detailed description of variables.. Coefficient values are reported as percentages. In parentheses below coefficient estimates are robust t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980) ) and firm clustering (Petersen (2009) (White (1980) ) and firm clustering (Petersen (2009) (White (1980) ) and firm clustering (Petersen (2009) (White (1980) ) and firm clustering (Petersen (2009) (White (1980) ) and firm clustering (Petersen (2009) (White (1980) ) and firm clustering (Petersen (2009) ). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. (White (1980) ) and firm clustering (Petersen (2009) This table presents an excerpt of the results from regression analyses of firms' financial disclosure (models 1-3), CEO compensation (model 4), and CEO turnover (model 5) policies. In these regressions, we separate analysts who are affiliated and unaffiliated with the followed firm, with analysts classified as affiliated if their employers have an investment banking relationship with the firm and unaffiliated otherwise. See Appendix 1 for a detailed description of variables. Coefficients on control variables and firm and year-fixed effects are suppressed for brevity. Coefficient values are reported as percentages. In parentheses below coefficient estimates are robust t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White (1980) ) and firm clustering (Petersen (2009) 
